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Venture Capital in Europe: investors and targets 
Venture capital is a key driver for the growth and development of business and its importance 
in Europe has been increasing in the last decades. This study provides additional insight on 
venture capital by evaluating the characteristics of the venture capitalists (VCs) that operate in 
Europe and by giving an overview of the investment strategies and portfolios, as well as of the 
characteristics of the funded businesses and the level of survivorship of targets. The analyses 
suggest that VCs tend to invest more in high tech industries and confirm the cyclicality of VC, 
as the number of investments and the sum invested decreased during the crisis.  
Keywords: venture capital; target; investment portfolio; investment strategies; Europe; 
survivorship; crisis. JEL: G24 
1. Introduction 
Venture capital is a form of intervention in new firms, or also in companies that need to introduce a 
substantial innovation, and it is performed by specialised investors – venture capitalists, VCs – that 
are able to overcome asymmetries of information and the uncertainty that characterise this type of 
investments. Prior to capital injection, VCs perform screening activities to select only the best 
business ideas, and during the investment phase they perform monitoring activities, to track the 
performance of the target firm. During the monitoring, the VCs generally also provide value added 
services, transferring financial and managerial skills to the target. 
The literature suggests that venture capital is a key driver for the growth and development of new 
businesses and for the whole economy (Gompers, 1995; Metrick and Yasuda, 2011), especially 
during downturns, when VC operates as alternative source of funds, because bank loans offer 
decreases or faces more restrictive conditions. 
The benefits for the VC backed firms are various. In general, target companies show a higher 
growth rate, as well as higher revenue, employment rate, margin and income level (Croce et al, 
2013). Moreover, VC backed businesses register a higher rate of survivorship and a better return at 
the time of exit (Gompers, 1996; Jain and Kini, 2000). In fact, although usually firms are 
underpriced at the time of the IPO, this underpricing appears to be lower for VC backed firms 
(Barry et al, 1990), although evidence is contrasting (Brav and Gompers, 1997; Brau et al, 2003).  
This study aims at analysing the characteristics of VCs that operate in Europe, examine their 
investment strategies and evaluate the level of survivorship of the target firms. The research 
contributes to the existing literature by providing an updated analysis of VC investment portfolios, 
but also by investigating the crisis period which has not been studied yet in detail by the specific 
literature on venture capital.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 reviews theories and previous evidence; 
section 3 presents the sample and the methodology; section 4 analyses the investment portfolios; 
section 5 presents the data on exit strategies and evaluates the survivorship rate; the final section 
concludes. 
2. The features of venture capital in Europe 
Venture capitalists invest in target companies through equity or quasi-equity instruments in a 
medium-long term perspective. This type of intervention is generally included in the broad area of 
private equity, which refers to the funding of private firms. VC intervention can be classified 
according to the stage of the target firm at the time of the investment (EVCA, 2013). The first stage, 
named seed financing, relates to informal entrepreneurial ideas, in which the main asset is 
represented by the innovative business idea; venture capital in this context aims at supporting the 
research and development of the product or service. Firms in the second phase (early stage) have a 
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formal entrepreneurial idea, but they have not entered the market yet. VCs might provide capital to 
finance the development of the product and the marketing phase. Finally, firms receiving 
investments for expansion and later stage are already active and operating, but need to expand their 
production or introduce an important innovation. This distinction is not exhaustive and boundaries 
between stages are blurred; nevertheless, it provides a first guideline to understand the type of 
contribution of venture capital to new or existing firms.  
VC is particularly suitable for new firms (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2001) because it is able to reduce 
asymmetries of information and provide support to new businesses which typically face more 
capital constraints (Dal-Pont Legrand and Pommet, 2010). New firms might not have access to 
funds through the traditional channels, such as bank lending or raising funds via the market. In fact, 
banks might consider new firms as particularly risky and to compensate for this, they might 
increase the interest rate. This however might have the perverse effect to scream only the worse 
borrowers (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) and hence banks might decide not to lend. The access to 
market by new companies might be difficult as well, as the market might believe that managers 
issue capital only when stocks are overvalued (Greenwald et al, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984) 
and, as a consequence, the offering might be undersubscribed.  
VCs can be financial intermediaries (investment funds or investment banks) or non-financial 
companies (corporate VCs, government led initiatives or business angels – the latter are informal 
investors providing funds to new entrepreneurial ideas). The investment objective and the exit 
strategy might depend on the type of investors: financial intermediaries are usually more concerned 
with the return of investments, while corporate VCs (CVCs) might aim at technology transfer, that 
takes place during the investment, when CVCs have the opportunity to access the project funded 
and to follow its development (Basu et al., 2011). Should the CVCs find the product or service 
developed by the target interesting, it might then decide to acquire the firm or to buy the patent, for 
instance. Government-sponsored venture capitalists (GVCs), on their turn, might address funds to 
facilitate the development of a specific area or to promote entrepreneurship among the weakest 
groups of the population. The type of investor might also affect the level and quality of value added 
services provided by the VCs to the target, but empirical evidence on the effective contribution of 
the various type of investors is unclear (Luukkonen et al., 2013). 
Exit strategies are commonly defined prior to investment and include IPO, trade sale, sale to the 
firm management or to other investors. The timing of exit and the effective disinvestment strategy 
are influenced by external factors, such as changes in the market conditions that can delay the exit 
or influence the return to the VCs. For instance, in case of IPOs, VCs might postpone the exit to 
avoid particularly adverse market conditions.  
According to the European Venture Capital Association (EVCA, 2013) the most common exit 
strategy by counter value in Europe since 2007 to 2013 has been the trade sale (on average 40.3% 
of the total amount at cost of disinvestments between 2007 and 2013), while contrary to 
expectations, IPOs involve only a limited percentage of the targets and of the counter value 
generated by the deals. Write offs involve 16% of the amount. 
The economic cycle is one of the most relevant factors able to influence the availability of funds 
and the development of VC, together with the regulatory and institutional framework of the 
investment country (Gompers et al, 1998; Jeng e Wells, 2000; Ayyagari et al, 2011; Bonini and 
Alkan, 2012), as well as the GDP, the presence of a developed secondary market for IPO and the 
characteristics of the job market (Gompers et al, 1998; Jeng and Wells, 2000). These features 
determine the level of attractiveness of a market for VCs and help in explaining the differences in 
the development of venture capital among the various countries (Bonini and Alkan, 2012; Ayyagari 
et al., 2011 for a study on emerging markets). 
EVCA data (EVCA, 2013) on funding highlight a contraction of funds collected since 2007, year of 
the inception of the crisis. The negative trend continued until 2013 (despite an increase in 2011) 
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when incremental funding stopped at 4.02 billion Euros, around half of the amount raised in 2007 
(tab. 1). 
 
Tab. 1: Funding for VCs 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Funding 8.15 6.21 3.63 3.21 5.17 3.86 4.02 
Figures in billion Euros. 
Source: elaboration from EVCA, 2013. 
 
In the last years, most of the funds of VC have been provided by governmental agencies, with a 
positive and growing contribution over time (tab. 2). Private investors follow, with around 16 
percent in 2013. Corporate investors have been among the main contributors as well, especially 
between 2010 and 2013. Funds of funds have provided a relevant percentage of total funds in 2012 
and 2013. 
 
Tab. 2: Top 3 funds provider from 2007 to 2013 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Private 
individuals 
8.7 Private 
individuals 
11.3 Government 
agencies 
24.6 Government 
agencies 
30.6 Government 
agencies 
28.9 Government 
agencies 
32.9 Government 
agencies 
33.8 
Banks 8.3 Corporate 
investors 
13.8 Private 
individuals 
11.6 Private 
individuals 
16.7 Corporate 
investors 
12.3 Corporate 
investors 
13.5 Private 
individuals 
16.1 
Government 
agencies 
7.9 Family 
offices 
10.6 Banks 11.2 Corporate 
investors 
13.4 Private 
individuals 
12 Fund of 
funds 
6.9 Fund of 
funds 
8.7 
Figures represent the percentages of total incremental funds.  
Source: elaboration from EVCA, 2013. 
 
EVCA also shows that the targets operating in high tech industries represent on average 44.5% of 
investments and 35.9% of target companies in VCs portfolios since 2007. More specifically, life 
sciences, computer and consumer electronics attract most of the funds available each year (EVCA, 
2013).  
 
3. Data description and methodology 
To have a better insight on the portfolio choices of VCs operating in Europe, we examine 
information on investors and target portfolio firms obtained from ThomsonOne. We select a sample 
of VCs, requiring the VCs to have concluded at least one new deal since January 2003 and to 
disclose the sum invested, in order to analyse the evolution of investments both in terms of numbers 
and counter value. The final sample includes 43 VC funds managed by 37 different managers. 
The sample includes 38 financial intermediaries (32 investment funds, 3 investment banks and 3 
other financial or banking institutions) that overall invested 95% of the sums received by the targets 
in the sample. There are also 2 corporate PE/venture funds, 1 business angel, 1 local business 
development programme and 1 evergreen investor.  
Around 60% of the VCs in the sample are European and 35% are US. Japan and Singapore are 
represented by one VC each.  
The strong presence of US investors might be related to the strong tradition and historical 
development of VC in the United States. US investors might have built strong reputation and deep 
knowledge of their home market, which now enable them to operate also in distant countries. 
Additionally, more experienced VCs might receive more investment requests because of their 
stronger reputation, which is a key driver in the choice of the investment partner among targets. In 
fact, the literature finds that when the target firm has to choose among different investing proposals 
elaborated by different venture capitalists, the choice is taken on the basis of the reputation of the 
venture capitalist, rather than on the financial or contractual clauses (Hsu, 2004). 
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Finally, US investors might be so numerous because they might take part to co-investment projects 
with European partners. Co-investments create the opportunity to join a deep knowledge of the 
market of the local venture capitalist and the reputation and competences of the more experienced 
non-local investors. Additionally, according to Cumming and Dai (2010), more experienced and 
higher reputation investors are less subject to local bias.  
Most of the VCs declare to be mainly specialised in seed, early stage and later stage (27), while the 
others focus on balanced stage or other investment stages (16).  
4. Investment portfolio analysis 
The VCs in the sample invested in 1,172 targets1 as at end March 20132, with a total counter value 
of 4.82 billion Euros. The 38% of the investments was still in the investment portfolio at the same 
date.  
On average every venture capitalist invested 112 million Euros. Only 7 VCs invested more than 200 
million Euros, while the others invested lower amounts, with a minimum of 3 million (Figure I). 
The number of cumulated investments per venture capitalist ranges from 4 to 155. The number of 
deals of each venture capitalist depends on various factors, such as the investment opportunities 
(e.g. the number of targets), the amount of funds raised by the VCs (the higher the funds available, 
the wider the investment opportunity set) and the investment strategy (some investors specify 
geographical or industry criteria, limiting the set of potential targets).  
Figure II shows the average sum invested per target company, which is around 4 million Euros, 
ranging from 0.2 million to 13 million. In general, large VCs in the sample invest in a high number 
of targets, while the opposite holds for small investors, with few exceptions3.  
Figure I: Target companies (upper axis) and sum invested (lower axis) by each VC as at end March 2013.  
 
 
 
                                                 
1 1,160 are investments in targets and 12 in other funds. 
2 The first investment done by the VCs in the sample was made in 1992, while the last in 2013. 
3 The correlation between sum invested and number of investments is 84%. 
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Figure II: average sum invested per target. Data in thousand Euros. 
 
 
4.1. Investment stage 
Around 85% of the sums invested are dedicated to the typical VC stages (seed, early stage, 
expansion and later stage). More in detail, the expansion stage absorbs 34.8% of the sums invested 
(1.7 billion Euros), followed by the early stage (1.2 billion). Also amounts for later stage are 
relevant, especially for investments in non-European targets (tab. 3). Some of the investments 
classified as later stage might relate to investments completed according to a staging strategy, i.e. 
the investor does not release all the funds at once, but splits the investment in more tranches which 
are made available according to a predetermined schedule.  
 
Tab. 3: Sums invested by investment stage 
Investment stage 
Total 
(mln €) 
Of which 
Total 
(%) 
Of which 
Europe 
Rest of the 
world Europe 
Rest of the 
world 
Seed 287.12 99.71 187.41 6.0% 2.1% 3.9% 
Early Stage 1199.35 303.91 895.44 24.9% 6.3% 18.6% 
Expansion 1674.13 503.84 1170.29 34.8% 10.5% 24.3% 
Later Stage 935.11 246.67 688.44 19.4% 5.1% 14.3% 
Acq. for Expansion 60.32 29.65 30.67 1.3% 0.6% 0.6% 
Acquisition 139.02 90.77 48.25 2.9% 1.9% 1.0% 
Bridge Loan 13.26 0.22 13.04 0.3% 0.0% 0.3% 
LBO 148.74 120.43 28.31 3.1% 2.5% 0.6% 
MBI 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
MBO 176.89 176.89 0.00 3.7% 3.7% 0.0% 
Open market purchase 3.99 1.20 2.79 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 
Other 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
PIPE 62.09 5.42 56.68 1.3% 0.1% 1.2% 
Recap or Turnaround 50.95 5.91 45.03 1.1% 0.1% 0.9% 
Secondary Buyout 21.97 21.97 0.00 0.5% 0.5% 0.0% 
Secondary Purchase 1.09 0.00 1.09 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
VC Partnership 41.37 0.82 40.55 0.9% 0.0% 0.8% 
       
Total 4815.52 1607.44 3208.08 100.0% 33.4% 66.6% 
Of which: VC 4095.70 1154.12 2941.58 85.1% 24.0% 61.1% 
VC typical stages are reported in bold. 
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4.2. Geographical diversification 
On average 42% of the investments involve foreign targets. The figure increases to 100% for some 
Swiss, Polish and Luxembourg investors (probably due to the limited size of the countries), while it 
is very low (4%) for some US VCs, which might have a wider range of investment opportunities in 
their home market, and might decide to fund only few selected targets in non-domestic countries. 
In the sample, 47% of targets are European (42% of sums invested), while the remaining firms are 
mainly US (50% of the total and 93% of non-European target companies). Investments in the US 
absorb the majority of sums invested (53% of the whole sample portfolio and 96% of the sums 
invested in non-European targets).  
Only 5 investors in the sample have injected capital in exclusively one country, while most of the 
VCs have invested in 2 to 5 foreign countries (Figure III). The first generally present a specific 
investment criteria that limits the area in which the VCs can invest. On the other hand, only one 
investment fund in the sample has a high degree of geographical diversification (19 countries). In 
fact, the risks of investing in foreign unknown markets can eliminate the potential benefits deriving 
from geographical diversification. Indeed, VCs should have a deep knowledge not only of the target 
company, but also of the regulatory and competitive framework in order to pursue a strong 
geographical diversification.  
Geographical diversification can also be achieved through syndicated investments with foreign 
VCs. All the VCs in the sample, but one, have participated to syndicated investments, often with 
foreign co-investors. 
 
Figure III: Distribution of VCs (y axis) according to the number of countries invested in (x axis).  
 
 
For all the VCs it is possible to individuate a main country and determine its importance on the 
basis of the number of target companies and sum invested4. On average, the 71% of the investments 
are concluded in the main country, which usually is also the country that receives the largest shares 
of funds (on average 69% of total sums invested by each VC). 
Despite European VCs are the most numerous in the sample, their overall portfolio weights only for 
the 33% of the sums invested, underlining an important contribution to funds invested in European 
                                                 
4 Only in 6 cases the main country by number of investments and the main country by sum invested do not match. In 
case the number of investments in a given country is equal to the number of investments in another country, the main 
country is the one receiving a larger amount of funds.  
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targets by VCs located in other areas (mainly the US). European VCs have invested around 80% of 
the total amount of 1.6 billion euros in European targets, while non-European VCs have invested 
22% of funds in European firms and the remaining 78% outside Europe. Despite the strong 
international character of venture capital investments, data shows that investments in closer markets 
are still frequent and relevant, probably because of a better understanding and knowledge of the 
regulatory frameworks and market conditions of nearby countries. Additionally, European investors 
might have more difficulties in entering foreign markets (especially the US) for the presence of 
strong local competitors. 
 
 
4.3.  Industry diversification  
A further source of diversification attains to the industry of the target. Evidence is in line with the 
data reported by EVCA (EVCA, 2013): the industries that receive more VC are life science 
(biotechnologies and medical) and ICT.  
Indeed, in the sample, life science companies represent 37.4% of targets and absorb more than 47% 
of the sum invested (figure IV). Similar figures emerge for ICT companies which are 34.4% of the 
targets and received 28% of the sums, for a total of 1.3 billion Euros. More traditional industries 
have received smaller amounts of funds. This is consistent with the preference of VCs for 
innovative projects, with a high rate of growth, which are more common in high technology 
industries.  
In the sample, only one venture capitalist focuses on a single industry (Industry and Energy), while 
all the others pursue industry diversification. Most of the VCs that invested in biotechnology also 
invested in medical companies, probably exploiting specific knowledge and similar skills in 
evaluating the targets in these two industries. 37 VCs invested at least in three different industries. 
One investment fund has invested in 16 different industries (the same venture capitalist that showed 
the highest degree of geographical diversification).  
 
Figure IV: Investment distribution by industry: sum invested (million euros – right axis) and targets (left axis). 
 
 
4.4.  Investment trend  
Another interesting aspect to evaluate is the evolution of investments in the latest years (from 2000 
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to 2012), which can provide insight on the trend of investments during the latest crisis. 
Overall the number of investments follows a positive trend during the full period. It is useful to 
provide more details on the pre and post-crisis statistics5. On average, 67% of active VCs have done 
at least one new investment each year, although the percentage decreases after the financial crisis. 
In fact, the figure is 71% for the period 2000-2006, while it is 63% for the following period (2006-
2012). The difference is positive and statistically significant, underlining a decrease in the ratio 
after 2007 (tab. 4). 
 
Tab. 4: main descriptive statistics on the evolution of investments 
 
VCs that have 
invested to total 
active VCs 
Number of 
yearly 
investments 
Sum invested 
(in million 
Euros) 
Mean 0.675 6.76 18.316 
Standard 
deviation 0.112 2.20 11.697 
    
Mean 2000-2006 0.715 7.78 23.870 
Mean 2007-2012 0.630 5.57 11.836 
difference 0.085* 2.21** 12.034** 
    
T statistic 1.42 2.03 2.25 
Unilateral test. H0: difference=0; H1: difference>0 
* statistical significance at 10%; ** statistical significance at 5% 
 
The crisis seems also to have impacted on the average number of investments per year. On the 
whole period this figure is 6.76 (computed as the ratio between the total investment in year T and 
the number of venture capitalist that have invested in year T). Before 2007 it is 7.78 million, while 
it decreases to 5.57 during the period 2007-2012. The difference between the two sub periods is 
2.21 and it is positive and statistically significant (tab. 4).  
Also when comparing the average sum invested6 for the period 2000-2006 to the period 2007-2012, 
we see a decrease from 23.87 to around 11.84 million. Again, when testing for the difference of 
means, we obtain a positive and significant difference (tab. 4).  
It is possible to illustrate this phenomenon also graphically. Figure V shows the evolution of 
investments, both in terms of number of investments and in terms of sum invested starting from 
20007. The trend of investments is positive until 2004, when the figure reaches its maximum with 
more than 270 investments and around 700 million Euros invested. After that year, the figures drop, 
despite the slight increase between 2006 and 2007, and then diminishes again, until a very modest 
rise after 2010 (Figure VIII).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Results of the following tests remain similar when taking 2008 as the first year of the crisis, instead of 2007. 
6 The average is computed as the ratio between total sum invested for a given year and number of venture capitalists 
that have invested in that year.  
7 The number of investment exceeds the number of firms if the VCs invest more than once in a target. The 1,172 targets 
received 1,900 rounds. The 7 investments (for a total of 146 million Euros) are excluded from the analysis.  
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Figure V: Evolution of sum invested (th Euros, solid line, left axis) and number of investments (dotted line, right axis).  
 
 
5. Exit strategy and survivorship rate of targets 
The exit strategy is crucial in determining the performance of VC investment. Many factors 
contribute to the type of exit that can be pursued, such as the industry of the target company, the 
macroeconomic conditions and the characteristics of the VCs.  
Of the total 1,172 investments, 12 are investments in other investment funds and are excluded from 
this analysis. Of the remaining 1,160 target companies, 437 were still in portfolio as at 31 March 
2013. Almost all the target companies still in portfolio were active (94%), while a small percentage 
was under LBO (4%) (Tab. 5). Five companies went public (1%) and three completed an 
acquisition (1%).  
With reference to exits, 43% of the companies have been acquired or merged to other firms. A 
relevant percentage of companies were active at the moment of disinvestment (32%), when the 
company was transferred to another investor (such as private equity fund), while the defunct or 
bankrupt companies where 10% of the exits; 4% was under LBO. The others have concluded an 
IPO (12%).  
Tab. 5: Status of target companies 
  
Number of 
companies as % of Total as % on sub-total 
Exit 723 62%  
Of which Acquisition 286  40% 
 Pending acquisition 5  1% 
 Active (transferred to other investors) 231  32% 
 Merger 13  2% 
 In registration 1  0% 
 LBO 32  4% 
 Went public 84  12% 
 Bankrupt 6  1% 
 Defunct 65  9% 
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Still in portfolio 437 38%  
Of which Acquisition 3  1% 
 Active 409  94% 
 LBO 19  4% 
 Went public 5  1% 
 Defunct 1  0% 
    
Total 1,160 100%  
 
If we assume that the worst scenario for a VC portfolio is represented by bankruptcy and failure of 
the target companies, we can proxy the success of a VCs portfolio with the rate of survivorship of 
the target companies, defined as Ѕ = 1 – Ω , where Ω is the percentage of companies with status 
‘bankrupt’ or ‘defunct’. In the sample considered, the number of bankrupt companies is 6, while the 
defunct are 66. Overall, the Ω of the sample is hence 6.2% (72 companies out of 1,160) and 
therefore the value of S is 93.8%. The determinants of the survivorship rate might relate to several 
target and investors characteristics, influencing the level of diversification of the portfolio and 
investment strategies. We expect that VCs focusing on one industry are more subject to shocks in 
the specific industry, such that, when a negative event causes the failure of a business project (or 
company), it might cause the failure of other similar or related projects or companies. One example 
might be the introduction of a new regulation after the investment has already taken place: for 
instance, for life science targets, a new rule that hinders the use of specific methodologies, such as 
clonation, or specific procedures which are recognised to be dangerous or unethical. This might 
have a negative effect on the expected profitability of targets, which are already funded, that make 
use of these methodologies or procedures. The same holds for geographical concentration and the 
effects of country specific shocks on the portfolio. Nevertheless, a certain degree of geographical 
and industrial specialization might help the VCs in raising knowledge and competencies of specific 
industries or markets, and hence improving their screening activity when selecting their investment 
targets. 
Additionally, VCs investing only in companies in one stage might not diversity their investment 
maturity. For instance, the level of uncertainty is higher during the seed stage and hence the level of 
risk is higher. Staging is a way to dilute investments over time and increase monitoring. These 
activities, together with other value added services, help in boosting the target performance, 
reducing the probability of bankrupt, and hence increasing VCs return at exit. Reputation and 
experience play a major role in the screening phase and hence we expect targets financed by more 
experienced VCs to have a higher rate of success. Besides, risk of a single investment should be 
lower for a given venture capitalist if the latter participate to a syndicated investment, where also 
other VCs and investors bear the risk of the business project. Finally, because of their specific 
competencies, VCs that are financial intermediaries should be able to provide higher quality 
services, with beneficial effects on the target performance, which should translate into lower default 
rate.  
The expectations above described are summarised by the following equation. 
  
S = α + β1N_Ind + β2N_Country + β3N_Stage + β4Year + β5N_inv + β6SI_inv + β7synd_foreign + 
β8EU + β9Fund + β10Bank + v 
 
Where 
• N_Ind: number of industry where the VC invested 
• N_Country: number of countries where the VC invested 
• N_Stage: number of stages where the VC invested 
• Year: vintage year of the VC 
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• N_inv: percentage of investments in the main country 
• SI_inv: percentage of sum invested in the main country 
• synd_foreign: percentage of foreign co-investors 
• EU: dummy equal to 1 for European VCs, 0 otherwise 
• Fund: dummy equal to 1 for investment funds, 0 otherwise 
• Bank: dummy equal to 1 for investment banks, 0 otherwise 
• v: error term 
 
Table 6 shows the regression results. Starting from the complete model, five different specification 
are tested. Geographical diversification appears to have a positive and significant impact on 
survivorship, although the relevance of the main country plays a major role as well. This might 
convey the idea that the better the knowledge of the main country, the higher the success; however, 
everything else equal, VCs that are able to diversify geographically have a more successful 
portfolio than others. Industry diversification shows a negative and significant sign. VCs that are 
focused on a limited number of industries are able to better evaluate investment opportunities and to 
increase the survivorship of the VC backed firms. Year shows a positive sign, suggesting that more 
experienced VCs obtain lower survivorship rate. While this might be counterintuitive, further 
research might clarify these results. Some possible explanations include the fact that younger VCs 
might be more aggressive and able, therefore, to attract the best fund managers with better 
screening and monitoring skills. Moreover, they might apply stricter investment criteria to build a 
good reputation during their first years of activity. Finally, the vintage year of the VC does not 
coincide with the vintage year of the management firm. With reference to the dummy isolating 
European VCs, results show that their portfolios have a higher level of survivorship if compared to 
non-European investors.  
The remaining control variables do not seem to have a significant impact on survivorship. In 
particular, the dummies for investment funds and investment banks are not statistically significant, 
suggesting that financial intermediaries’ portfolios have a level of success comparable to other VCs.  
 
Tab. 6: Regression results 
 1 2 3 4 5 
n_ind -0.008* -0.008* -0.008* -0.009** -0.009** 
n_country  0.009  0.008*  0.008*  0.008*  0.008* 
n_stage -0.001     
year  0.005***  0.005***  0.005***  0.005***  0.005*** 
n_inv  0.199**  0.200**  0.183**  0.142*  0.087* 
si_inv -0.078 -0.081 -0.077 -0.063  
synd_foreign  0.031  0.033  0.028   
eu  0.040**  0.042**  0.042**  0.041**  0.036** 
fund -0.018 -0.018 -0.023 -0.030 -0.028 
bank  0.017  0.017    
constant -8.565** -8.664** -8.657** -8.936*** -9.162*** 
      
R2 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.47 0.45 
Adj. R2 0.32 0.34 0.36 0.36 0.36 
 
*, ** and *** indicate respectively 10%, 5% and 1% significance level. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
Understanding the determinants of VC success appears of outmost importance especially for the 
development of entrepreneurship and the support of business during crisis periods, when new 
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ventures might find difficulties in accessing the traditional funding channels. The literature shows 
how VC can be the most suitable form of financing for new businesses, as it can overcome the 
asymmetries of information that characterise companies at their first stage of life cycle and perform 
screening and monitoring services that contribute to the success of the target. 
This paper has investigated the behaviour of VCs that invested in Europe, to evaluate the 
composition of their portfolios and to highlight which factors might contribute to level of 
survivorship of their portfolio firms. Evidence shows that VC investments follow a cyclical 
behaviour and the number and counter value of investments has decreased after the latest financial 
crisis. Furthermore, the survivorship rate of investment portfolios appears related to country and 
industry diversification and the degree of knowledge of the market.  
Further research is needed to shed light to a number of aspects concerning, among others, venture 
capital investment strategies, the impact of the various characteristics of VCs (not limited to type 
and age) on the level of survivorship of portfolio firms, as well as target and VC performance levels 
during boom and crisis periods. 
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Appendix 
 
Tab. A1: Main country in which venture capitalists invest. 
n Venture capitalist 
Main country by 
number of 
investments 
N investments 
Main country 
by sum 
invested 
Sum 
invested 
(th Euros) 
Total 
investments 
Total sum 
invested (th 
Euros) 
Main country 
investments as 
% of Total 
investments 
Main country 
SI as % of 
Total SI 
1 VC1 France 8 France 15026.9 14 29239.4 57% 51% 
2 VC2 UK 49 Germany 181033.1 136 595699.6 36% 30% 
3 VC3 France 6 France 17353.0 7 21051.8 86% 82% 
4 VC4 USA 40 USA 276829.7 61 455328.6 66% 61% 
5 VC5 USA 40 USA 310175.0 64 508336.1 63% 61% 
6 VC6 Germany 8 Germany 20909.1 17 37721.5 47% 55% 
7 VC7 USA 7 UK 49192.5 21 166714.9 33% 30% 
8 VC8 Switzerland 16 Switzerland 52032.1 21 86252.1 76% 60% 
9 VC9 USA 19 USA 134557.5 20 138250.2 95% 97% 
10 VC10 USA 20 USA 47554.2 24 57553.9 83% 83% 
11 VC11 Germany 4 UK 7305.9 9 24627.5 44% 30% 
12 VC12 Portugal 8 Portugal 26059.4 16 47632.3 50% 55% 
13 VC13 UK 48 UK 26128.4 48 26128.4 100% 100% 
14 VC14 Austria 5 Austria 2777.7 10 8280.0 50% 34% 
15 VC15 USA 71 USA 266963.2 75 304714.5 95% 88% 
16 VC16 USA 3 USA 36349.7 6 46965.8 50% 77% 
17 VC17 USA 10 USA 34079.2 13 40860.5 77% 83% 
18 VC18 USA 28 USA 144245.6 30 154091.7 93% 94% 
19 VC19 Norway 7 Norway 25910.7 9 27877.7 78% 93% 
20 VC20 Germany 6 Germany 18259.1 12 24808.0 50% 74% 
21 VC21 Norway 2 Norway 18802.6 6 56306.5 33% 33% 
22 VC22 USA 2 Finland 2499.8 4 5232.4 50% 48% 
23 VC23 USA 8 USA 49956.0 13 61969.1 62% 81% 
24 VC24 UK 18 UK 5328.0 18 5328.0 100% 100% 
25 VC25 Lithuania 3 Russia 4592.0 9 11431.0 33% 40% 
26 VC26 USA 7 USA 20563.6 11 40324.0 64% 51% 
27 VC27 Finland 16 Finland 3088.8 16 3088.8 100% 100% 
28 VC28 USA 103 USA 335908.4 157 445185.5 66% 75% 
29 VC29 USA 23 USA 48845.5 24 51985.9 96% 94% 
30 VC30 USA 26 USA 270583.0 27 276610.0 96% 98% 
31 VC31 USA 5 Germany 34250.7 10 72662.2 50% 47% 
32 VC32 UK 11 UK 8750.5 11 8750.5 100% 100% 
33 VC33 USA 9 USA 7868.2 12 15268.9 75% 52% 
34 VC34 Russia 4 Russia 53852.0 4 53852.0 100% 100% 
35 VC35 USA 16 USA 26681.8 30 46446.1 53% 57% 
36 VC36 UK 20 UK 16107.8 25 19465.2 80% 83% 
37 VC37 USA 25 USA 165661.2 29 187900.1 86% 88% 
38 VC38 Estonia 2 Estonia 4000.2 4 6600.8 50% 61% 
39 VC39 USA 8 USA 56778.2 20 114102.6 40% 50% 
40 VC40 Switzerland 24 Switzerland 62147.7 29 76210.8 83% 82% 
41 VC41 USA 25 USA 45160.9 26 75169.3 96% 60% 
42 VC42 USA 26 USA 51697.1 27 81705.6 96% 63% 
43 VC43 USA 48 USA 255507.0 50 297791.7 96% 86% 
 
